boundary · section 10 of 10

Evidence boundaries

What does this evidence not establish?

Posted rates are dated, the index is a composite rather than a workload predictor, the subsidy analysis is structural on the user side, and the forecast bets are judgments over a short record.

This section is the reopen condition for every other part on the site. Read it before quoting a figure.

The section itself

  • All prices are evidence of posted rates on 2026-08-20, not durable claims. Provider pricing changes weekly.
  • The quality-adjusted cost analysis uses the Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index, which is a composite benchmark score — it does not predict performance on a specific workload. The index is also an editorially-weighted nine-benchmark composite (text/English-centric, agentic-shifted since v4.1); version overhauls have moved scores by ~23 points, so cost-per-index-point figures are order-of-magnitude evidence, not precise rankings.
  • The GPU pricing data is compiled from independent sources including two grade-A direct captures (getdeploying.com, spendark.com) and a compiled evidence file; both GPU claims are verified.
  • The subsidy analysis is structural (the subsidy exists, it distorts decisions) and now has a cost-side quantitative anchor: frontier-lab list pricing runs below sustainable infrastructure return (OpenAI gross margin 33% in 2025 vs its own 46% forecast, inference costs ~$8.4B and 4x YoY; Anthropic 40%) — posted API prices remain effectively investor-subsidized. The user-side subsidized fraction is still unmeasured.
  • The forecast bets above are dated, binary, probability-bearing judgments over a short record — not calibrated forecasts. FC4 and FC6 have named missing baselines; their probabilities are structured priors.
  • Recheck by: 2026-11-20, or after a material model release, pricing change, or hardware generation shift.

Who uses this section, and for what

Reader questions that route through here

In sequence